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Flanders: Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best”

PARDONS AND THE THEORY OF THE “SECOND-BEST”
Chad Flanders*
Abstract
This Article explains and defends a “second-best” theory of pardons.
Pardons are second-best in two ways. First, pardons are second-best
because they represent, in part, a response to a failure of justice: the
person convicted was not actually guilty, or he or she was punished too
harshly, or the punishment no longer fits the crime. In the familiar
analogy, pardons act as a “safety valve” on a criminal justice system
that doesn’t work as it ideally should. Pardons, in the nonideal world we
live in, are sometimes necessary.
But pardons are also second-best because they can represent
deviations from other values we hold dear in the criminal law: fairness,
consistency, and nonarbitrariness. Pardons can all too often reflect
patterns of racial bias, favoritism, and sheer randomness, both when
they are given too generously and when they are not given generously
enough. So we need to have a theory of how the pardoning power
should be used, even when it is used to correct obvious injustices in the
criminal justice system.
This Article takes up the task of showing how pardons are justified,
but more importantly, this Article also theorizes how pardons should be
used. Specifically, it introduces two constraints on the pardon power,
one that constrains pardons when we consider them individually and
another that constrains pardons when we consider them as a whole. It is
this latter ground that has especially been underdeveloped in the
literature, and this Article provides grounds for evaluating pardons not
merely taken one-by-one, but when more than one pardon is given out
at a time, or over the course of an administration.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, near the end of his term of office, Mississippi
Governor Haley Barbour gave some form of executive clemency
(pardon, early release, or suspension of sentences) to nearly two
hundred people.1 Although the move was nearly unprecedented in
Mississippi,2 the Mississippi Supreme Court later upheld it against a
procedural challenge.3 The “pardons” (as I shall collectively call them,
following most reporters) were—and properly remain—intensely
1. Richard Fausset, Outgoing Gov. Haley Barbour’s Pardons Shock Mississippi, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/nation/la-na-barbour-pardons20120113; Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour Pardons Nearly 200, Including Convicted Killers,
CRIMESIDER (Jan. 11, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57357252504083/mississippi-gov-haley-barbour-pardons-nearly-200-including-convicted-killers.
2. Haley Barbour’s ‘Shocking’ Pardon Spree: A Guide, WEEK (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/223306/haley-barbours-shocking-pardon-spree-a-guide (stating
that the previous pardon high for a Mississippi governor was thirteen).
3. See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012) (“[W]e are compelled to hold
that—in each of the cases before us—it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the
Constitution’s publication requirement was met.”); Holbrook Mohr, Haley Barbour Pardons:
Mississippi Supreme Court Rules Pardons Are Valid, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 6:19
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/haley-barbour-pardons-mississippi-supremecourt_n_1332769.html.
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controversial.4 There was ample evidence that Barbour had “played
favorites” in handing out the pardons. Some of those pardoned had
personal connections to the Governor through Mississippi’s
controversial “trusty” program;5 others Barbour pardoned were
“members of prominent Mississippi families, major Republican donors
or others from the higher social strata of Mississippi life.”6 One
individual pardoned was football great Brett Favre’s brother, who had
been convicted of killing a friend in a drinking-and-driving accident.7
Taken as a whole, the pardons also showed a disturbing racial
distribution. Nearly two-thirds of the pardons during Barbour’s tenure
were granted to whites, even though the majority of those convicted of
crimes in Mississippi are black.8
In his public statements, Barbour gave only a vague theological
justification for his mass pardons, saying that Christians believe people
can be redeemed and deserve a second chance.9 He added that the
4. Fausset, supra note 1 (“The actions have brought criticism from victims’ families,
everyday Mississippians like [local resident Terrance] Winters, and Democratic officials
including Jim Hood, the state attorney general, who persuaded a judge to put some of the
pardons on hold.”).
5. “Trusties” were convicts who worked for the Governor, at his mansion, doing routine
maintenance and landscaping. The program has since been abolished by Barbour’s successor.
Jessica Bakeman, Miss. Governor Ends Controversial Mansion Trusty Program, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-0120/mississippi/52694334/1. Barbour pardoned five people with life sentences—including four
murderers—who had worked in the trusty program during his administration. See Rich Phillips,
Controversy Puts Mississippi’s Long-standing ‘Trusty’ Program in Spotlight, CNN (Jan. 18,
2012, 12:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/16/justice/mississippi-trusty-program.
6. Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/us/manypardon-applicants-stressed-connection-to-mississippi-governor.html.
7. Judy Keen, Barbour’s Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY (Jan. 13,
2012, 9:43 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippibarbour-pardons/52511486/1 (“Among those pardoned was Earnest Scott Favre, brother of
former NFL quarterback Brett Favre. He pleaded guilty to driving in front of a train while drunk
in 1996, resulting in the death of his best friend.”).
8. Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So
Disproportionately White?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.csmonitor
.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-the-forgiven-so-disproportionately-w
hite (“Out of a total of 222 acts of clemency given by Barbour during his tenure . . . two-thirds
benefited white prisoners. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the state’s prison population is black.”); see
also Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (“Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation,
where nearly 70 percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained
disproportionately by white people and the well connected.”).
9. Haley Barbour, Statement of Former Governor Haley Barbour on Clemency, OFF.
GOVERNOR
HALEY
BARBOUR,
http://web.archive.org/web/20121023090030/
http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2011/dec/1.13barbourclemencystatement.html
(last
visited Aug. 30, 2013). The Governor stated:
Christianity teaches us forgiveness and second chances. I believe in second
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pardon board had recommended many, if not all, of those pardoned for
executive clemency.10 In an op-ed written later, Barbour defended the
tradition of pardoning “trusties” and asserted that those who commit
crimes of passion such as murder are least likely to re-offend and so are
no longer dangers to society.11 Four of the trusties Barbour pardoned
had been convicted of murder.12
Such dramatic exercises of the pardon power such as Barbour’s raise
deep and troubling questions not only about the pardons taken
individually but also about the justifiability of the pardon power as a
whole. When a governor pardons (whether an individual or a large
group), he or she is making an exception to the laws that otherwise
apply to everybody.13 Even pardons that look justifiable on their face
(because a prisoner has suffered enough or because the governor deems
a sentence against an individual to be too long or too harsh) may violate
the governor’s duty to impartially administer the law.14 Taken to an
extreme, this argument would even limit a governor’s ability to pardon
in an error-correcting capacity (say, if someone were actually innocent),

chances, and I try hard to be forgiving.
The historic power of gubernatorial clemency by the Governor to pardon
felons is rooted in the Christian idea of giving second chances. I’m not saying I’ll
be perfect, that no one who received clemency will ever do anything wrong. I’m
not infallible, and no one else is. But I’m very comfortable and totally at peace
with these pardons, especially of the Mansion inmates.
Id.
10. Id. (“The State Parole Board reviewed about ninety-five percent of these 215 cases as
well as many, many more applications that were rejected. I accepted the Parole Board
recommendations about ninety-five percent of the time.”).
11. Haley Barbour, Op-Ed, Why I Released 26 Prisoners, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-18/opinions/35439863_1_inmates-clemencytrusties.
12. Haley Barbour Pardons 4 Killers: Convicts Were Trustees at Miss. Governor
Mansion, GRIO (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://thegrio.com/2012/01/10/haley-barbourpardons-4-killers-convicts-were-trustees-at-miss-governor-mansion.
13. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
28 (1997) (summarizing Kant’s opposition to pardons, given that rulers have a “categorical
moral obligation to punish those who have committed crimes”); see also Dan Markel, Against
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1455–56 (2004) (arguing against excessive discretion to reduce
or remove sentences on retributivist grounds). In raising concerns about the possible
arbitrariness of pardons, this Article is in broad sympathy with Markel’s thesis.
14. For an excellent statement of the tension between mercy (including pardons) and the
rule of law norms of the administrative state, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2008) (“[T]he
rise of the administrative state has made unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law, and a
phenomenon to be viewed with suspicion. The expansion of the administrative state has
showcased the dangers associated with the exercise of discretion.”); id. at 1333 n.5 (collecting
sources on the tension between mercy and justice).
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provided that the correct procedures had been used.15
Barbour’s pardons also came at an inconvenient time: when there
have been increasing calls for executives—including and perhaps
especially the President16—to increase the number of pardons granted.17
The pardon power has been underused of late, especially by the current
and former Presidents, perhaps in overreaction to certain manifestly
political uses of the pardon, such as President Clinton’s infamous
pardon of Marc Rich.18 But Barbour’s pardons seem to show, in an
elaborate and troubling fashion, how mass pardons can go very wrong
and would seem to condone, if not justify, executive hesitancy, delay,
and general overcaution in pardoning.19
This Article defends the pardoning power (especially against those
who would find the power always unjustifiable) while finding that there
are, and should be, strong moral limits to how it can be used. To see
how the pardon power can be justified (and, as a result, how individual
pardons are justified), we need to distinguish ideal from nonideal
circumstances. In identifying a distinction, this Article borrows from
and modifies the work of John Rawls.20 The distinction between ideal
and nonideal circumstances is closely related to the idea of the “secondbest.”21
15. See generally William Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, WILSON Q., Autumn 2010,
at 18 (defending the value of finality in criminal proceedings with application to the Troy Davis
case).
16. See Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted Clemency More Rarely Than Any Modern
President, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 2, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-hasgranted-clemency-more-rarely-than-any-modern-president (commenting on the infrequent use
of pardons by President Obama).
17. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing
Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 158 (2009) (calling for a “return to an era in which
clemency is a key part of a functioning system of justice”); Clara H. Drinan, Clemency in a
Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2012) (arguing for greater use of pardon
power); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1212 (2010) (“[P]ardon has important uses in the federal justice system,
and recent experience has shown that a president who fails to pardon regularly throughout his
term will have difficulty dealing with pent-up demand at its conclusion.”); PARDON POWER,
http://www.pardonpower.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (blog of P.S. Ruckman, Jr.).
18. Jessica Reeves, The Marc Rich Case: A Primer, TIME (Feb. 13, 2001),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,99302,00.html (providing details of the
controversial pardon of Marc Rich).
19. See Barkow, supra note 17, at 157 (noting political risks of pardoning).
20. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
21. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Second Best & Nonideal Theory, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (May 17, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/legal-theorylexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“Despite its technical origins, the idea behind the
second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to a problem (or ‘optimal policy
option’) is infeasible. The best should not be the enemy of the good; so, when the first-best
policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-best
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In ideal or near-ideal circumstances sentences are for the most part
just, and the criminal justice system works by and large in a fair
manner. In an ideal society, there is virtually no need for pardons. But
in nonideal circumstances, sentences tend to be overly long, harsh, or
cruel, and the criminal justice system is biased against certain groups. I
think it fairly obvious that we (in America, and perhaps other parts of
the world22) exist in nonideal circumstances.23 In such a context,
pardoning can be justified as a way to more perfectly approximate what
the criminal justice system would accomplish in ideal circumstances—
by limiting unjust sentences, for example, or by removing unjustified
post-conviction disabilities. This, indeed, is how pardons are commonly
justified in the literature.24
This justification does not end the enquiry, however, but only begins
it, for it leaves open the question of what constraints on the pardon
power may exist even in nonideal conditions. Even nonideal theory
operates under some constraints—constraints on how far we can relax
certain moral absolutes so as to more perfectly approximate ideal
justice.25 If pardons are applied in a reckless and arbitrary manner, this
may be impermissible, even under nonideal theory. This constraint on
nonideal theory raises the possibility that the way Haley Barbour
pardoned in general is unjustifiable, even if some (or all) of his
individual pardons were fully justified. It also suggests that not
pardoning at all could be better in some cases than pardoning in a
discriminatory, biased, or random manner.
This Article seeks to define a consensus in some areas of the
criminal law but to challenge the consensus in others. In defending
pardons, this Article tries to provide a minimal account of the pardon
solutions.”). For a different, though related use of second-best, see generally Adrian Vermuele,
Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003).
22. The United States has the highest prison population in the world, with China a distant
second. See World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06
/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
23. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (discussing the crisis of mass incarceration in America);
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (same); Adam
Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan.
30,
2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_
gopnik (same).
24. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 1364 n.144 (collecting uses of the “safety valve”
justification for pardons); George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences
and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP.
212, 212 (2004) (explaining the importance of having a “safety valve” in a system of mandatory
punishments).
25. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 246 (“Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of
[the ideal] conception and held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without
sufficient reason.”).
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power and in doing so tries to be unobjectionable, or nearly
unobjectionable, to most scholars of the criminal law. This portion of
the Article does not mean to court controversy, and it defends pardons
on the narrowest of grounds: pardons can be necessary to secure justice
in particular cases—not as grand acts of mercy but in many cases as
matters of individual right.
But in finding that pardons may be arbitrarily distributed, this Article
opens a new avenue for challenging pardons, one that has been largely
underdeveloped in legal literature: as violations of fair or equal
treatment.26 Even when we have considered an executive’s pardons one
by one, there is still another level on which we can evaluate them: were
the pardons just considered as a whole? Justice, this Article maintains,
has to be considered both at the retail and at the wholesale level.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines a prominent
theory of the pardoning power advanced by Kathleen Moore.27 Moore
defends a narrow view which sees pardons as justified only when they
are necessary to correct an injustice in the administration of the criminal
law. Part I also shows, surprisingly, that many if not all of Haley
Barbour’s pardons may have been justified under Moore’s theory.
Part II examines the possibility that even though many of Barbour’s
pardons might be justifiable individually, there may be something
wrong with his pardons taken as a whole. Moore supports pardons as
justifiable when done to correct an injustice in an individual case, given
that our criminal justice system is flawed. But Haley Barbour’s pardons
show that even pardons that correct individual injustices in the status
quo may still be, on another level, unjustified. This happens when
pardons are done in the wrong way, including when they are distributed
in a morally discriminatory or morally arbitrary manner.28 Part II
examines whether this is the case with Haley Barbour’s pardons and
with pardons in the second Bush administration.
26. Some have dealt with the problem of biased pardons, although they take a slightly
different focus than I do. See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency,
Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women’s Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
967 (2001) (suggesting a possible positive role for biased pardons, based on a theory of
“exemplary” pardons); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons,
Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 117–23 (2003)
(discussing possible Constitutional constraints on pardons based on gender or race).
27. See generally MOORE, supra note 13; Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and
Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1993) [hereinafter Moore, Pardon for Good and
Sufficient Reasons].
28. This has obvious implications for the debate on “comparative desert.” See, e.g., Ronen
Avraham & Daniel Statman, More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved
Punishment Be Unjust? 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series No. 243, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2146749.
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Part III extends the analysis of Barbour’s pardons into a larger point
about reforming the criminal justice system in nonideal circumstances.
There are constraints on giving pardons that go beyond basing them on
good and sufficient reasons. These constraints focus on how reform in
the criminal justice system ought to happen. Even when we pursue just
ends, such as when we pardon those who have been sentenced unjustly,
we must pursue them within some limits—that is, even if we should
pardon more, there are better and worse ways of pardoning many
people.
This Article uses Barbour’s pardons as examples of a problem with
dispensing pardons on arbitrary or immoral grounds, where the pardons
on a case-by-case basis may be justified, but when taken as a whole, a
troubling pattern emerges. Recent research into the use of presidential
pardons shows that they also have been granted on an arbitrary or
possibly discriminatory basis.29 So the problem is not an isolated one,
reserved to a particular governor of a particular state. It shows a danger
in the pardon power in general and underscores the pressing need to
develop more elaborate standards for the proper use of the pardon.30
I. A DEFENSE OF THE PARDONING POWER
The pardon power has long been controversial in itself, and not only
because of the controversy surrounding instances of the power's use.31
This part illustrates Karen Moore’s influential explanation of when
pardons are justified. Moore defends pardons narrowly, as necessary to
correct serious injustices in the legal system. Moore’s view of the
pardon power is strict, and on some accounts might not amount to a
theory of executive “mercy” at all, if by “mercy” we mean judgments
based on whim or caprice or compassion rather than specific
reasoning.32 This may well be an advantage of Moore’s account,
29. See especially the excellent e-book produced by ProPublica, DAFNA LINZER &
JENNIFER LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY (2012). See also Editorial, The
Quality of Mercy, Strained, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/
opinion/sunday/the-quality-of-mercy-strained.html?_r=0 (discussing the possible racial bias in
presidential pardons).
30. Regarding the recent pardoning controversy in South Korea, see Choe Sang-Hun,
Departing South Korean Leader Creates Furor with Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/outgoing-south-korean-leader-creates-furor-wit
h-pardons.html (“With less than one month left in office, the departing president of South
Korea, Lee Myung-bak, granted special pardons on Tuesday to political allies, a longtime friend
and dozens of others who have been convicted of corruption and other crimes.”).
31. See generally Markel, supra note 13.
32. See id. at 1436 (“Mercy I define first as the remission of deserved punishment, in part
or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or
sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to
engage in criminal conduct.”). Markel would more likely categorize Moore’s defense of pardons
as a defense of “equitable discretion.” Id. at 1440. For more on the distinction between
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because it can help us to separate acts of pardoning from acts of mercy.
Not all acts of pardoning are acts of mercy, and some acts of pardoning
might be morally obligatory.
Moore defends pardoning, then, but not as an unfettered right of the
executive to forgive crimes or as a gift that falls on those the sovereign
happens to favor (the traditional view which was arguably in the
background of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling upholding
Barbour’s pardons).33 For Moore, an executive cannot just pardon for
any reason or for no reason at all. Rather, the executive must pardon
only for “good and sufficient reasons” relating to the offender’s
culpability and to the proportionality of the offender’s punishment. A
pardon, in other words, cannot be given simply because the executive
wants to give it.34 It has to be justified morally.
While we might think that Barbour’s pardons could only be
defended on the traditional view (under which the sovereign has an
absolute right to pardon), this part argues that Barbour’s pardons might
also be defended under Moore’s view. For it could turn out that Barbour
had, in Moore’s terms, “good and sufficient reasons” to pardon each
offender: one offender’s sentence might have been too harsh, for
instance, or another offender might have been wrongly convicted. To
see whether the pardons were justified, we would need to examine each
case separately on its own merits.
A. Moore’s Theory of Pardons
Moore defends the pardoning power as an extension of retributive
justice,35 but adopting her theory does not require adopting retributivism
tout court.36 Retributive justice, in her view, punishes offenders because
they deserve it. In an imperfect system of criminal justice, offenders
may not always get what they morally or legally deserve, and so need to
pardoning and mercy, see infra Section I.B.
33. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was made on narrow, separation of powers
grounds, but the idea that the executive’s decision was unreviewable by any other branch
certainly suggests a power that is accountable to no other body. One of the dissenters was more
explicit about the roots of the pardon power. See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 440 (Miss. 2012)
(Pierce, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to pardon . . . is an act of the sovereign’s ‘mercy and
grace.’” (quoting Whittington v. Stevens, 98 So. 111, 114 (Miss. 1923))); see also Moore,
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 282 (“The pardoning power of the
great monarchs of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was analogous in theory and
practice to divine grace. Like grace, the freely given, unearned gift of divine favor, a royal
pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore, it required no justification and was not
subject to criticism.”).
34. Moore, supra note 27, at 283.
35. See generally MOORE, supra note 13, at 87–178 (“A Retributivist Theory of
Pardons”).
36. See infra note 44.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 4

1568

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

be pardoned, either by being released or by having their sentences
reduced. As Moore writes, “A pardon is justified when the procedures
miscarry, giving the state a legal, but not a moral, license to punish.”37
What exactly Moore means by “procedures miscarry” is ambiguous,
and could mean at least two things. She could first mean that
somewhere in the process a legal mistake has been made. This could
happen when, say, a judge misapplies the sentencing guidelines and
gives a longer than authorized sentence, or instructs the jury incorrectly,
leading to a conviction. These legal mistakes are presumably ones that
could be corrected by an appellate court, but could also be the basis for
an executive pardon for “good and sufficient reasons.” If the law were
followed correctly, the state may have had the right to punish as it did,
but the law wasn’t followed, so it doesn’t have that right. A pardon can
correct the failure of actors within the legal system to live up to the
legal system’s own commands.
But there is another, deeper way in which procedures can miscarry.
A legal process, even when it is followed correctly, can lead to a
morally wrong result. For example, an innocent person may be
convicted even though all the proper legal procedures have been
followed—no actor in the legal system has made a legal mistake. When
something like this happens, there may be no legal error we can directly
or obviously identify.38 What this leaves us with is a moral error that
needs correcting.
Suppose, for instance, that the evidence that exists at the time of a
trial leads a reasonable jury to convict someone of a crime.39 Every
appellate court subsequently upholds the conviction. Nonetheless, many
years after the trial, new evidence comes to light that clearly exculpates
the convicted person. Here the procedures have nonetheless miscarried,
not because they were not followed (they were), but because they led to
the wrong result. From a point of view external to those legal
procedures, we can see that something has gone wrong, even though in
a strictly legal sense, nothing has.40 In cases like these, a pardon can be
justified, because the reason for the legal procedures (ideally) is to
protect the innocent. To prevent a morally innocent person from being
punished is a “good and sufficient reason” to pardon, says Moore.41
More controversially, suppose that a sentence handed down, while
37. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286 (emphasis
added).
38. See Baude, supra note 15, at 19.
39. I borrow this example from Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra
note 27, at 286.
40. As a result, we can imagine a theory of pardons that justifies them only in cases of
strict legal error (the rules have not been followed correctly), but not in cases of moral error
(where the procedures have been followed, but the result is morally wrong).
41. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287.
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perfectly legal, is nonetheless, by some recognizable moral standard,
too harsh or unfair.42 If this is the case, although the state may legally
punish that person a certain term of years, the state has no moral right to
do so. That person may have his sentence permissibly reduced by an act
of executive mercy, according to Moore.43 How to decide when a
sentence is too harsh is a complicated question, which Moore does not
attempt to answer, nor will this Article.44 But we might intuitively agree
that some sentences, in principle, might be too harsh for an offender
given his crime, or given other factors. In those cases, the executive has
a “good and sufficient reason” to reduce the sentence, or to end it
altogether.
In general, for Moore, “pardons should be used as part of a broader
constitutional scheme to ensure that sentences are assigned justly.”45
This can happen when the legal procedures miscarry in an obvious way
(the judge who has misapplied sentencing guidelines), or in a less
obvious way: when the punishment is not consistent with the values that
underlie the criminal justice system as a whole, such as protecting
innocence, or of assigning punishment that is proportional to the
offense.46 A legalistic pardon, then, would be one that corrected a legal
failing in the relevant procedures: to fix a legal mistake that somewhere
along the line has been made but has not yet been rectified. A moralistic
pardon does something different—it corrects a moral error that has
occurred even though the legal procedures have been followed
correctly. A moralistic pardon looks at the procedures and announces, in
light of the spirit of the legal system (but not its letter) that a mistake
42. George W. Bush’s pardon of Scooter Libby was arguably of this sort. One
commentator noted:
Presidents have also commuted sentences they feel are too harsh without
removing the taint of the conviction. President George W. Bush did just that
when he commuted the sentence of Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney’s former chief
of staff. “I respect the jury’s verdict,” Bush said at the time. “But I have
concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive. Therefore, I
am commuting the portion of Mr. Libby’s sentence that required him to spend 30
months in prison.
Michael A. Lindenberger, The Quality of Mercy: Don’t Jump on Haley Barbour All at Once,
TIME (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2104577,00.html.
43. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287.
44. Moore defines harshness in retributive terms, as being a sentence that exceeds the
offender’s desert. MOORE, supra note 13, at 98. But one could also imagine it being defined in
other theoretical terms: a harsh sentence could be one that no longer had any utilitarian point (it
didn’t deter other offenders, or rehabilitate the offender), or that caused too much suffering. On
this last point, see the illuminating remarks in David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 1619, 1691–93 (2010).
45. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286.
46. Markel also makes a similar point. Markel, supra note 13.
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has been made and fixes it. In sum: a legalistic pardon upholds the rules
of the system that for whatever reason weren’t followed in the earlier
proceedings; a moralistic pardon upholds the values of the system
that—again, for whatever reason—the rules of the system didn’t track.
B. An Objection Briefly Considered
This, again, is not the place to present a fully vetted theory of
pardons; this Article borrows Moore’s theory, for the most part, to test
whether even if pardons taken individually might be for good and
sufficient reasons, they might be unjust when taken as a whole. This
will be this Article’s main contribution to the debate over pardons, and
this Article pursues this contribution in Part II. But first, considering an
objection to Moore’s theory may help flesh it out a bit.
Some might object that Moore’s theory is not really a theory of
pardons at all. A theory of pardons, the objection goes, should specify
those places where the executive can permissibly exercise mercy. But
the above cases show no such thing; rather, they show cases where the
executive must act, so that he or she is morally required to stop the
injustice. Moore’s theory of pardons makes pardons mandatory and not
permissible.47
But it is not truly an objection to Moore’s theory to note that it
diagnoses at least some acts of pardon as morally mandatory. Indeed,
there are certain cases in which presidents or governors are morally
required to prevent a grave injustice. It would be a flaw in a theory if it
could not identify these instances. A pardon that a governor is morally
required to give—say of a person who is actually innocent of his
crime—is not any less a pardon for that.
We might worry, still, that on Moore’s theory, there are only
mandatory pardons, that there is no place for discretion on whom or
when to pardon. Even if this is so, this may not be a decisive objection
to its classification as a theory of pardons (in short, I do not think that
pardons must contain only permissible acts).48 But there is still
47. Antony Duff makes a version of this point in his review of Moore’s book. See R.A.
Duff, Review Essay/Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 51, 61 (1990)
(arguing that, in some cases, Moore’s theory renders pardons “necessary or obligatory, not
merely permissible”).
48. This may be the place to again emphasize that I am interested in pardoning, not in
mercy. Mercy may necessarily be a discretionary act, tied to any reason or no reason at all, and
be something that “someone has neither a natural nor a legal right to claim—it is bestowed upon
the offender—perhaps like some understandings of grace.” Markel, supra note 13, at 1437. This
may be true of mercy, but it does not seem to me to be true of pardons. In some cases, a person
may have a right to a pardon (because, for example, she is innocent, and cannot achieve
vindication in any other way but an executive pardon). For a similar distinction (between mercy
and equity), see Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1325–30 (2004).
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something to say to this. First, exactly what punishment an offender
deserves will usually be controversial. Does every offender who
commits a wrong deserve to be arrested, to be prosecuted, to be given
this sentence and no other? Always? There are no definitive answers to
these questions.49 When an executive decides that a person’s sentence is
more than he deserves, the executive is acting with some discretion, in
the same way that many other actors in the criminal justice system have
acted with discretion. When the executive makes this decision, he may
not be morally obligated to act in a certain way (to pardon or not to
pardon); there may simply be ambiguity as to what the offender
deserves in this case.
Indeed, the executive has a certain advantage in the process because
she comes at a later stage: she can see how the offender has responded
to the punishment, whether conditions have changed so that the offender
no longer deserves the original punishment, or whether the offender has
reformed herself.50 No matter which overarching theory of punishment
we adopt, the executive has more information about whether those
purposes are being accomplished in a fair way.51 The governor, say, can
see if the punishment is still useful, just, or deserved. There is still
enormous room for judgment here; as stated, there is no clear answer to
the question of who deserves clemency and who does not. So even on
Moore’s theory, there is room for saying that some pardons are
permissible and some are mandatory.
C. Justifying Haley Barbour’s Pardons
Moore’s theory of pardons in the end is relatively unambitious. It
does not rely (or need to rely) on a theory of mercy or even (as I have
presented it) on any particular theory of punishment. What it says is
fairly simple. If there are flawed moral or legal judgments in the
criminal justice system, a pardon is one way that those judgments can
be corrected, and corrected in the name of the rules and values of the
legal system itself. But can such a narrow view justify Haley Barbour’s
pardons, or does it instead show why the pardons may be illegitimate?
49. I make this point about the indeterminacy of desert at length in another paper, Chad
Flanders, The Limits of Retribution, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 23–
24). Also see the excellent paper by Alice Ristroph on the same point, Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006).
50. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive
Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1533 (2000).
51. Even on a retributive theory, it seems incorrect to say that we can learn nothing about
an offender’s act after he had committed it: we may learn about his culpability, or his character,
only later. The idea that we have perfect knowledge of an offender’s competence or ability to
choose to commit a crime at the time of trial seems to be a mistake. Of course, new exculpatory
evidence can be discovered after a trial is concluded, which would also give obvious grounds,
on retributive theory, for changing or removing the sentence.
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The answer to this question is rather straightforward on Moore’s
view, although perhaps in other respects unsatisfying: we can only tell if
we look at the pardons one at a time, and see if they are supported by
“good and sufficient reasons,” in Moore’s phrase.52 If some sentences
were incorrectly imposed, then Barbour was right to pardon those who
received those sentences. If some other legal, procedural rule were not
followed, then that case too would be eligible for a pardon. In short, the
analysis under Moore’s theory is individualistic, rather than holistic.53
We do not have to look to any other pardon to see whether a pardon in
an individual case was justified.
It is unlikely that there were many such “legalistic” pardons granted
by Barbour; indeed if there were any at all, Barbour would have wanted
to draw attention to these pardons. More probable is that Barbour gave
many “moralistic” pardons. Barbour may have rightly believed that
some offenders had suffered enough from their punishments or faced
collateral consequences from their punishments that were no longer
warranted (if they ever were). Certainly this could have been the case
for those who were given early release for medical reasons (although
Barbour’s office defended these pardons, rather cynically, in terms of
saving the state money).54
In particular, Barbour may have felt that some offenders had been
given too long of a sentence, even if the offenders were properly
sentenced under the criminal code of Mississippi. For example, the
summer before his departure from office, Barbour commuted the
sentences of two African-American women who were sentenced to life
for an armed robbery that netted a total of eleven dollars.55 In the case
of Earnest Scott Favre (the brother of Brett Favre), Favre was originally
sentenced to one-year house arrest for his crime, but had that increased
52. Some of the early news reports covering Barbour’s pardons conceded this.
53. For a related, but more technical, use of these terms, see generally THOMAS HURKA,
Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DRAWING MORALS: ESSAYS IN ETHICAL THEORY 154
(2011) (distinguishing between desert in an individual case and desert across cases, and calling
the latter way of looking at desert “holistic”).
54. Barbour Issues Statement on Clemency, NESHOBA DEMOCRAT (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:10
PM),
http://neshobademocrat.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=25005
&SectionID=63&SubSectionID=493 (“Half of the people who were incarcerated and released
were placed on indefinite suspension due to medical reasons because their health care expenses
while incarcerated were costing the state so much money. These individuals suffer from severe
chronic illnesses, are on dialysis, in wheelchairs or are bedridden.”). Barbour’s office did go on
to say that these people no longer represented threats to society.
55. Patrik Jonsson, Did Haley Barbour’s Pardon Spree Go Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0111/Did-Haley-Barbour-spardon-spree-go-too-far (“Last summer, Barbour was hailed by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People as a ‘shining example’ for commuting the life sentences of two
African-American women who had spent 16 years in prison for an armed robbery that yielded
$11.”).
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to a suspended fifteen-year sentence “after he left his house to go
fishing.”56 In these three cases, Barbour probably thought that the
resulting sentences were too harsh, and so a pardon was warranted.57
More compelling still, Barbour may have believed that some
suffered from the stigma of their criminal conviction, and that this was
too much: they had, in his view, suffered enough from their crimes.
They deserved the right to be able to apply for a job without the burden
of a past felony conviction, or to reclaim their right to vote, or to hunt.58
Indeed Barbour’s office made this last point explicit in his remarks
defending his pardons.59 Especially if we believe such things as felony
disenfranchisement are per se unjust and immoral punishments,60 a
pardon designed to negate this feature of Mississippi sentences would
seem to be one that is done for good and sufficient reasons.
In short, it is hard to argue against the supposition that at least some
of Barbour’s pardons were justified under Moore’s analysis. Probably at
least some of the sentences were cases where the state had a narrow
legal right to punish, but the punishments were in fact morally
unjustified. Barbour, on Moore’s view, had the power to pardon in these
cases. Some of the cases, though, were probably not cases of pardons
for good and sufficient reasons: they were based on ties of friendship, or
because of lobbying, or for some other non-morally salient reason. They
could not be based on good and sufficient reasons.
Suppose then (even if counterfactually) that all of Barbour’s pardons
were done for good and sufficient reasons. We would have to tell a long
and detailed story about how this was so. We would have to say which
punishments were too long, or who (if anyone) was wrongly convicted.
We might have to tell a story about how some punishments, such as the
taking away the right to vote for convicted felons, are never permissible,
so that removing those punishments via an act of clemency would be
justified. If we could tell a story that gave a good and sufficient reason
56. Id.
57. At the same time, it could be argued that Favre’s original sentence was too lenient,
and that the later, longer sentence fixed this.
58. On this score, see Molly M. Gill, Op-Ed., Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s
Pardons Cause Such a Backlash?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:29 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbour-pardons_b_1217237.html (“What is
it about former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour’s pardons that irk us so much? It can’t be
because 189 people who were already out of prison and obeying the law will have better job
prospects and restored civil rights because he pardoned them.”).
59. “The pardons were intended to allow them to find gainful employment or acquire
professional licenses as well as hunt and vote.” Barbour Issues Statement on Clemency, supra
note 54.
60. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004)
(discussing the constitutionality and morality of laws disenfranchising felons).
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for each of Barbour’s pardons (assuming we could), then there would be
no objection to them, at least on Moore’s view.
But I want to register a sense of uneasiness about this conclusion, a
sense that goes beyond the suspicion that not all of Barbour’s pardons
could be individually justified. In what follows, this Article argues that,
even if all of the pardons were granted for good and sufficient reasons,
there can be problems with a governor’s pardons taken as a whole. That
is, we have to analyze the justifiability of pardons on two levels: first,
on the level of the individual pardon; and second, on the level of all the
pardons granted by an executive. There can be objections to the
pardoning power that appear only, or at least most clearly, on the
wholesale level. Part II considers these objections.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PARDONS EN MASSE
The general thrust of Moore’s view on pardons is this: there can be
flaws in the system of criminal justice that lead to results that are not
consistent with the underlying (for Moore, retributive) values of the
criminal justice system itself.61 If an executive pardons to correct those
flaws, his pardon is justified. As we saw in the last part, this means that
there seems to be in principle no reason why all of Barbour’s pardons
might not have been justified, as a means of correcting morally flawed
sentences. To see whether this was true, we would have to look at each
pardon individually.
This part raises some doubts about the moral sufficiency of this
approach—for there may be groups of pardons, all of which could be
justified individually, but which might still be morally wrong taken
together. This part first provides cases where a group of pardons
intuitively raise some moral questions. After each case, this part
explains why these moral questions might render some pardons as a
whole unjustified, or at the very least problematic. Part II concludes by
showing that Barbour’s pardons could be morally questionable in
precisely these ways.
A. Some Problematic Pardons
1. Racist Pardons
A governor in a southern state decides to commute62 the sentences of
four murderers on death row to life in prison without the possibility of
61. Dan Markel makes a related argument about the values of the criminal justice system
and of liberal democracy in justifying certain exercises of clemency. See generally Dan Markel,
State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005).
62. This Article will sometimes refer to these commutations as “pardons,” just for ease of
reference. But technically, they are commutations, not pardons.
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parole. He does this, he says, because he believes that the death penalty
is deeply immoral and inconsistent with the rule of law; and let us
suppose, just for the sake of argument, that he is right about this.63 The
death penalty is an unjustified and unjustifiable act of punishment, and
so anytime the state does it, the state is deeply in the wrong. On
Moore’s account, pardons for those on death row would be pardons for
good and sufficient reasons, because preventing some from being given
a deeply immoral punishment is (if anything is) a permissible reason for
a pardon.
But there is a catch. There are eight other people on the state’s death
row who the governor has decided not to pardon. He makes a vague
promise that he will pardon the others later, when it is politically
feasible, but he is at the end of his term, and his announcement of the
four pardons has engendered considerable controversy. He will most
likely not pardon the others.
Moreover (and this is the deeper problem), it turns out that the four
he has decided to remove from death row are all of the same color. They
are white, and the remaining non-pardoned death row inmates are black.
Indeed, this seems to be the only obvious difference between those the
governor has pardoned and those he has not; no meaningful distinction
can be manufactured from the different crimes the convicted murderers
have committed; all were grisly and gruesome, and all offenders were
convicted at roughly the same time. The governor mumbles something
about having no awareness of the race of those whom he pardoned (“I
just saw names”).64 But the fact is, the governor’s pardons were at best
selective and at worst racially motivated.
Here we have a case where the four pardons taken individually are
done for good and sufficient reasons. Each white person pardoned is
pardoned because his sentence of death was (we are supposing for the
sake of argument) immoral. But the problem is that the pardons were
63. The hypothetical case here bears some resemblance to Governor George Ryan’s
commutation of death sentences in Illinois, which has been much discussed in the legal
literature. See Markel, supra note 61 and sources cited therein. I should be clear, however, that
nothing hangs on the particular example; indeed, I have my doubts that the death penalty is in
fact per se immoral. See my paper, Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the
Death Penalty, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
64. This was, in fact, a justification offered for the color blindness of Barbour’s pardons—
that race was not listed on the application for pardon. One news report stated:
“A majority of the clemency cases were reviewed by the Parole Board
before being sent to Governor Barbour,” Barbour spokesperson Laura Hipp
told Reuters, which conducted an analysis of Barbour’s pardons. “Race was not
a factor in his decision. In fact, it wasn’t even listed on the Parole Board’s
application.”
See Jonsson, supra note 8.
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not comprehensive or consistent; or rather, if they were consistent, they
were consistent on the basis of race. The governor did not pardon all of
those who he had a good and sufficient reason to pardon.
Does this render the pardons illegitimate? There is a strong case that
it would. The pardons while justified individually are on the whole
distributed in a racially unfair way (ignoring for now whether it matters
if this was done intentionally or accidentally). So there is a norm that
may govern the granting of pardons that appears only on the level of
pardoning en masse, which we can call an antidiscrimination norm.65
Pardons that are distributed in a racially discriminatory manner would
seem to be morally objectionable, even if the pardons considered
individually are justified by good and sufficient reasons. How we
understand the force of this norm is open to debate,66 but something like
that norm exists and underlies our intuitive reaction to the “all white”
pardons scenario.
2. Pardoning “Favorites”
Suppose we make this one small change to the hypothetical: the
people the governor pardons are not all of the same race, but they share
something else in common: (1) they are friends of friends of the
governor, (2) they have hired professional lobbyists to make their case
to the governor, (3) they are veterans of the governor’s “trusty”
program,67 or (4) they or their relatives are high-profile donors to the
governor’s campaign.68 So, on this hypothetical, instead of pardons that
are based on race (or that happen to be given to members of the same
race), we have selective pardons to those with connections of some sort
65. Although it would seem intuitively different if the governor had announced that the
four black members of death row were to be pardoned, but not the eight white members. This
shows that the norm operating might be anti-caste, and not purely antidiscrimination. For a
discussion of the anti-caste principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 162 (1976).
66. We might wonder, for example, whether the norm is specifically an anti-racism norm,
or one more tied to nonarbitrariness or respect more generally.
67. See supra note 5 and sources cited (explaining the trusty program).
68. Again, this seems to have been the case with many of Barbour’s pardons:
Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70
percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained
disproportionately by white people and the well connected.
....
Mississippi’s pardon system, like those in other states, rewards applicants
who have both the financial means and the connections to seek reprieves
aggressively.
Robertson & Saul, supra note 6.
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or another to the governor. Again, let us say that there are four people
(out of twelve) who get pardoned, and all of them have this relevant
feature. Once more, we are assuming that the death penalty is an
immoral punishment, so those four who are pardoned have a good and
sufficient reason to be pardoned.
These pardons are nonetheless morally problematic for a similar,
though not identical, reason to the pardons based on race: the pardons
pick out a non-morally salient characteristic (closeness to the governor)
as a basis for distinguishing between like offenders. Here the
characteristic is possibly not as bad as race (given the fraught history of
race relations in America, and especially in the South), and may be less
invidious than choosing on the basis of race. But it still seems wrong to
show favoritism to those lucky enough to be friends of friends of the
governor, or who have the money to hire a lawyer to lobby the
governor. It is wrong and unjust to show favoritism in pardoning, even
though the pardons taken individually have good and sufficient reasons
to support them. Call this norm against selective pardoning the antifavoritism norm.
3. Random Pardons
Take many of the same facts from the two previous hypotheticals: a
governor decides to pardon some, but not all, of those on death row,
because it would be too politically unpopular to commute all of their
sentences. But this time she does not choose on the basis of race or
family (or happens to distribute her mercy only to those of a particular
race or with family ties); rather, she decides to hold a lottery,
commuting the sentences of the four who win the lottery. Again, let us
suppose that the death penalty is a deeply immoral punishment, and the
state is never justified in imposing it on anyone. So a commutation of a
person’s death sentence is always justified, for preventing someone
from suffering an immoral punishment is always a good and sufficient
reason. For each person on death row who wins the lottery,
consequently, there was a good and sufficient reason to have his
sentence commuted.69
Does it make better sense that the selective outcome of the lottery is
random, rather than based on the racist or otherwise biased choices of
the governor? It may make the pardons more acceptable, but still not
fully acceptable all things considered. For while the norms against racial
discrimination or favoritism are not violated, another norm is violated:
the norm against unequal treatment. The governor is not treating like
69. A similar example is introduced in Markel, supra note 13, at 1464, but for different
purposes. The classic thought experiment of chance and the criminal law is advanced by David
Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53 (1989).
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cases alike; instead she is just choosing arbitrarily, based on nothing
more than a random lottery. Those who do not win the lottery can
complain that they have been unfairly treated, because there is nothing
that makes their case different than those who have won.
Or can they? I confess to feeling more ambivalent about this case, an
ambivalence that was absent in the previous, race-based and favoritebased cases. Those who win the lottery have not benefitted from racial
discrimination or from family ties. Instead, those who win the lottery
get a gift, one that those who lose the lottery do not: and each had an
equal shot at getting the gift. Is the implication of the norm against
arbitrary treatment that unless all get the pardon, no one can? Do gifts
have to be distributed equally, or not at all?
In the case of pardoning, we may worry about a further implication
that randomness suggests—for what the lottery system resembles is
nothing so much as the old version of the sovereign’s right to pardon in
which the sovereign can decide how to pardon (for any reason, or for no
reason at all) just because he is the sovereign.70 This seems inconsistent
with a system that asks its officials, at all levels, to act according to
rule-of-law values like consistency and uniformity. So although this is a
closer case, pardons that are arbitrarily granted are problematic, even if
those pardons taken one by one, can be justified by good and sufficient
reasons.71 Such pardons violate the norm against arbitrary treatment.72
70. The ability of the sovereign to pardon only those he or she favored (on whatever
grounds) would also be an example of this. See Sang-Hun, supra note 30 (describing the pardon
power as the exercise of the sovereign’s power).
71. Avraham and Statman argue that the race case differs from the random case, because
in the race case one has been disrespected, but not when one has been randomly favored or
disfavored. But my intuitions differ here: why isn’t it a matter of disrespect to decide desert
questions on the basis of a lottery? Why wouldn’t this, as well, show a disrespectful attitude
towards the offender’s fate? Wouldn’t it also suggest a possible trifling attitude towards
questions of desert and justice? Avraham & Statman, supra note 28, at 8.
72. It is important to note that not all selective pardons are arbitrary. A favoritist method
of selection and a random method of selection may be objectionable, but not a method that, say,
selects whom to pardon based on the fact that some of those on death row committed less
gruesome crimes than others, or that some convicts were more reformed. One has commentator
has observed:
For example, though we may acknowledge the impossibility of ticketing all
speeding drivers and still favor ticketing some, we will not find every way of
determining which speeders are ticketed equally just. Consider the policy of
ticketing only those who travel at extremely high speeds, as opposed to that of
ticketing every tenth car. Compare these with the policy of giving tickets only to
speeders with beards and long hair or to speeders whose cars bear bumper
stickers expressing unpopular political views. While I shall not pursue this point
in detail, I take it to be obvious that these different selection policies are not all
equally just or acceptable.
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This principle requires qualification, though. For it seems that here,
more than in the previous cases, we might want to weigh more heavily
the wrongness of the underlying punishment: in this case, an immoral
and unjust execution. It may be that that wrongness would be sufficient
to outweigh the wrong done by a random pardon (however we might
specify that wrong). This may suggest that we are always doing an
implicit balancing between the harm of the wrong (i.e., unjust, harsh)
punishment and the harm done by a racist, biased, or random pardon. It
was only in the cases of racism and favoritism that it seemed clearer that
those wrongs were worse than the wrong of the unfair punishments (or
at least the unfair punishments of those who were lucky enough to be
pardoned). Our calculation could be more complicated still if it were a
question of arbitrarily pardoning some who had been wrongly convicted
or not pardoning any.
4. Pardons for the Wrong Reasons
Now consider a final twist on the above example. Let us suppose
that the governor now commutes the sentences of all twelve members of
death row. There is no question of unfair or arbitrary treatment of any of
them; they all get their sentences commuted and no one is excluded for
any reason. But there is again a catch. The reason, this time, that the
governor pardons all of them, is that they are (similar to the case of
favoritist pardons) friends of friends. He cannot get them out of prison
altogether (that would be politically infeasible), but he can prevent them
from being executed.
The death penalty is still, as we have been suggesting for the sake of
argument, a deeply immoral penalty, so that it is never justified that
someone be put to death for a crime they have committed. So the
pardons are in fact consistent with good and sufficient reasons for
mercy, because it is a good and sufficient reason to prevent someone
from receiving an immoral punishment.
But this, of course, is not the reason the governor gives for
commuting the sentences. He says he is commuting their sentences
because it is traditional to pardon members of the “trusty” program.73
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 149, 153 (1985). Selective pardons made for efficiency reasons too could be
justified—indeed, even if a lottery were used to make the choices. This is a point that deserves
much more investigation, for it deals with what are permissible means of selectively pardoning.
But that is for another paper: here I am interested in impermissible means. Thanks to John Inazu
for pressing me on this point.
73. Barbour, supra note 11 (“This was not a new thing. For decades, Mississippi
governors have granted clemency to the inmates who work at the mansion. I followed that
tradition four years ago and did so again at the end of my second term. No one should have been
surprised.”). Barbour’s past pardons of trusties were no less controversial. See Bob Herbert, The
Mississippi Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/opinion/
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Or it could even be that the governor says he’s pardoning the inmates
for good and sufficient reasons (the immorality of the death penalty),
but his real reason is because of the personal connections he has with
the inmates. Moreover, unlike the previous three cases, the governor has
pardoned all twelve of the death row inmates, so his treatment of them
is not in any way “selective.” To use Immanuel Kant’s helpful
terminology, the governor in this case is pardoning according to duty,
but he is not pardoning from the motive of duty.74 His pardons happen to
be coextensive with the pardons he ought to be giving.
Is there anything wrong with the pardons in this case? I think so,
because the professed reasons the governor gives don’t match up with
the proper reasons, and the professed reasons are not, in fact, good and
sufficient reasons for pardoning. To put it another way, there is a
disconnect between what would justify the commutations, and what in
fact justified them for the governor. What justified the pardons for the
governor was that the people who had their sentences commuted had a
personal connection to him. But (we are supposing) it turns out that
those who had a personal connection with him also were justified in
having their sentences commuted.
Still, it was in some sense a matter of sheer chance that those who
are no longer on death row in fact should not have been on death row in
the first place. They got off ultimately because of their connection to the
governor (and the governor’s subsequent favoritism), not for the good
and sufficient reasons that were available to justify their
commutations.75 It just happens that all twelve had this characteristic
this time, rather than just four of them.
So in short, we’ve eliminated the selectivity of the pardons, but
reintroduced another problem related to but not quite the same as the
problem of favoritism. The problem is that the reason that the governor
gives for the pardons isn’t the reason he should have given. I am not
sure exactly what to call this disconnect, but for the sake of
convenience, let us say that there is a sincerity constraint on pardoning:
the actual reasons for pardons have to be the good and sufficient reasons
for the pardons. No other reasons will do.76 It seems to me the weakest
form of wrongdoing that can be committed in a mass pardons case; it
also seems to me that this type of wrong will usually be accompanied by
some actual favoritism that leaves some deserving individuals without

16herbert.html?_r=0.
74. See, e.g., Barbara Herman, On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty, 90 PHIL.
L. REV. 359, 362 (1981) (providing an exposition of Kant).
75. For a similar sentiment, see Nathanson, supra note 72, at 157.
76. For a good explanation of the value of sincerity, and the related concept of publicity,
see Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1005–08 (2008).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/4

22

Flanders: Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best”

2013]

PARDONS AND THE THEORY OF THE “SECOND-BEST”

1581

pardons.77
B. Barbour’s Pardons Revisited
At the time of Barbour’s pardons, there was widespread outrage.78
Part of this, indeed probably most of it, was because of individual
pardons: the murderers who were pardoned when the wounds from their
crimes were not yet healed.79 But I also think there was a larger
disillusionment with Barbour’s pardons, which came not from analyzing
each case one at a time and deciding that the pardon in that case was not
warranted. After all, it seems very likely that some of the pardons were
justified by good and sufficient reasons: the ones who needed medical
release, for example, or those who were convicted long ago for minor
drug possession, and who wanted to be able to vote, or have an easier
time getting a job.
Yet many condemned the pardons as a whole, and the above section
may explain why this happened. Consider the antidiscrimination norm.
Two-thirds of those Barbour pardoned were white, while two-thirds of
the Mississippi prison population is black.80 Overwhelmingly, you had a
better chance at a pardon if you were white than if you were black. This
at least gives the appearance that Barbour violated the
antidiscrimination norm, if not intentionally, at least as a matter of
discriminatory effects. Indeed, the pardons might have been part of a
deeper, structural racism in the entire process of pardoning, from the
recommendation by the parole board for pardons to the granting of the
pardons themselves. Even if Barbour did not knowingly pardon more
whites than blacks (he was not aware of the race of those he pardoned),
the pardons may still have been the product of racism, and so
problematic for that reason.81
77. That is to say, it will not usually be the case that the class of those who deserve to be
pardoned will always be coextensive with the class of those who are friends of the governor.
78. Keen, supra note 7; Mark Memmott, Hundreds of Pardons, Some for Killers, Spark
Outrage in Mississippi, NPR (Jan. 11, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2012/01/11/145039829/hundreds-of-pardons-some-for-killers-spark-outrage-in-mississippi;
P.S. Ruckman Jr., Op-Ed., Barbour’s Last-minute Rush to Pardon, CNN (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:41
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/12/opinion/ruckman-haley-barbour-pardons/?hpt=us_c2.
79. See Memmott, supra note 78; Julia Dahl, 8 of the Murderers Barbour Pardoned
Killed Their Wives, Girlfriends, CRIMESIDER (Jan. 13, 2012, 2:13 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57358839-504083/8-of-the-murderers-haley-barb
our-pardoned-killed-their-wives-girlfriends.
80. See Jonsson, supra note 8.
81. One commentator has opined:
Perhaps more than incarceration rate disparities, however, pardon rate
inconsistencies suggest that biases may be less individual and more systemic.
In Mississippi, for example, black prisoners, on the whole, have fewer
resources than white prisoners, including access to personal lawyers, which
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There might have also been the perception that the pardons were
arbitrary, that they were simply indiscriminately given. The person who
Barbour happened to get to know as a trusty was pardoned, but one who
did similar service, and committed a similar crime, was not. Or a
convicted criminal who was able to get the Governor’s ear because he
had a relative working for Barbour might have gotten a pardon, but one
who had no connections to Barbour did not. Or further, someone who
could afford to hire an attorney to lobby Barbour got a pardon, but
someone without money and an attorney did not.
Pardons that are given on such an indiscriminate or random basis
might be thought to be unfair, because they treat those who are similarly
situated differently based on morally arbitrary factors.82 It becomes a
matter of mostly chance whether you would be pardoned: whether you,
or someone close to you, knew someone who could get the Governor’s
ear. But chance shouldn’t be the deciding factor. The only deciding
factor should be whether there were good and sufficient reasons for the
pardon. In other words, the reason for the pardon should be the good
and sufficient reason for the pardon and not any other reason.
So people may have been reacting to the apparently arbitrary nature
of many of Barbour’s pardons. The pardons seemed not to have been
made in any sort of orderly or reasoned manner.83 Even if many of those
pardoned were pardoned for good and sufficient reasons, there may
have been others who were not pardoned but who should have been,
may have led to fewer black prisoners requesting a pardon in the first place.
Id. Professor Stephen Nathanson has also noted:
What I want to stress here is that the arbitrariness and discrimination need not
be purposeful or deliberate. We might discover, as critics allege, that racial
prejudice is so deeply rooted in our society that prosecutors, juries, and judges
cannot free themselves from prejudice when determining how severe a
punishment for a crime should be. Furthermore, we might conclude that these
tendencies cannot be eradicated, especially when juries are called upon to make
subtle and complex assessments of cases in the light of confusing, semitechnical criteria. Hence, although no one decides that race will be a factor, we
may predict that it will be a factor, and this knowledge must be considered in
evaluating policies and institutions.
Nathanson, supra note 72, at 160 (emphasis in original).
82. See Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (“Many of the applications contain the type of
recommendations that a poor person could be hard-pressed to collect: character references from
state legislators or local elected officials. . . . In other cases, applicants relied on someone who
had the connections they lacked.”).
83. See Ruckman Jr., supra note 78 (“The signs of a last-minute rush abound. Well over
half of the warrants do not even provide the specific sentences that were handed down by the
courts. Other critical dates are missing right and left.”).
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because there were also good and sufficient reasons for pardoning
them.84 It at least looked as if Barbour might not have been entirely
consistent in choosing whom to pardon.
But with Barbour, it was worse than simply appearing inconsistent.
The pardons Barbour made didn’t seem to be based merely on chance
but were instead made for the wrong sort of reasons. They were made
because of connections to the Governor, whether these were personal,
familial, or the result of lobbying. It wasn’t as if Barbour held a lottery
to see who would get pardoned; this would still be unfair, but the
unfairness might be of a lesser degree. Rather, the people who were
pardoned (it seemed) had a connection to the Governor. In fact, it was
as if the main factor in many cases was the existence of this
connection.85 It would have been better if the pardons had been entirely
random; still morally problematic, but better.
If this were true in many cases, and not just one or two, then this
provides another reason for criticizing the pardons as a whole, even if
they can be justified case-by-case. For if the mode of distributing the
pardons is not just arbitrary, but based on favoritism, then the pardons
as a whole may be problematic, not because there are not good and
sufficient reasons for them (we are assuming there might be) but
because of the way they are given out. A bad mode of distribution
(connections to the Governor) might put into question all of the
pardons, even pardons that could have been justified for good and
sufficient reasons.86
C. Some Recent Presidential Pardons
A recent, searching report by the public interest group ProPublica
has raised questions about presidential pardons. The report reflects, on a
smaller scale, the problems that were noted in relation to Barbour’s
pardons.87 The two conclusions of the study, which were reported in the
Washington Post, were that the pardons granted by George W. Bush
heavily favored whites, and that “political influence . . . continued to
boost pardon applicants.”88 The study conducted by the authors was
based on a random sample of five hundred people out of the nearly two
thousand people who had requested pardons during Bush’s

84. See Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (giving examples of similarly situated convicts
who were not pardoned).
85. Id.
86. To be sure, a bad mode of distribution can be present even in one pardon; but when it
is done with many pardons, the badness of it becomes more evident (as was the case with
Barbour).
87. See LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29.
88. Id. at 30.
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presidency.89
The number pardoned by Bush during his entire presidency was 189,
a little less than the total number that Barbour pardoned in the final days
of his governorship.90 Yet they seem to reflect writ small what
Barbour’s pardons display writ large: when taken as a whole, pardons
can be problematic in a way they are not when they are taken
individually. The authors at ProPublica show this point by a series of
careful comparisons, between, say, a white woman who attempted to
defraud the IRS of more than $25,000 who received a pardon, and an
African-American beauty shop owner who was convicted of
underreporting her income, who did not.91 The report’s authors also
investigate in detail a case where a donation to a congressman helped
secure a last-minute pardon.92
Those in the Bush Administration expressed surprise at the result,
and insisted that the process was “colorblind.”93 And we may think that
the real problem here is the paucity of pardons (something that has
continued with a vengeance into the Obama Administration),94 and not
necessarily their basis, a point to which Part III returns. Another
problem may involve disagreement about the appropriate criteria for
selecting people for pardons. The Bush Administration’s officials
apparently took marriage as a key factor in signaling whether an
offender had been rehabilitated or not, as showing greater “stability.”95
But the officials also looked to more amorphous factors such as
“attitude,” which could open the door to all sorts of bias or could give
leeway to favor some over the others based on political pressure.96
There was, in fact, one instance of patent racial bias in Bush’s
consideration of a pardon for a Nigerian minister.97
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 5; Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Governor, Already Criticized on Pardons,
Rides a Wave of Them Out of Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, at A13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/us/gov-haley-barbour-of-mississippi-is-criticized-on-wave
-of-pardons.html?_r=0 (noting that Barbour pardoned a total of 193 criminals).
91. LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29, at 51.
92. Id. at 280 (noting the pardon efforts of luxury car dealer Dale Critz Jr. helped by
donations to Republican Representative Jack Kingston).
93. Id. at 90, 493.
94. David Jackson, Obama Not a ‘Pardoning’ Kind of President, USA TODAY (Nov. 2,
2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/11/02/obama-mitt-romneypardons/1676909 (“Obama has pardoned only 22 individuals during his time in office, while
denying 1,019 other clemency requests.”). Obama’s pardon rate is the lowest among any
modern president. Id.
95. LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29, at 102.
96. Id. at 71.
97. See id. at 215; see also Alison Gender, Furor over Bush Lawyer’s Racism in
Deportation Case of Nigerian Minister, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2008, 10:57 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/furor-bush-lawyer-racism-deportation-case-nigerian-
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A final, notorious example might also be worth mentioning. In 2007,
George W. Bush commuted the sentence of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby,
saving Libby from having to serve 2.5 years for his role in leaking the
identity of Central Intelligence Agent Valerie Plame.98 In his remarks
defending the pardon, Bush said that a thirty-month prison sentence for
Libby was “excessive.”99 Reportedly, Vice President Dick Cheney was
furious that Bush did not give Libby a complete pardon (Libby still
owed a $250,000 fine and remained a convicted felon).100 Although
many conservatives felt that Libby’s fine was a miscarriage of justice
(liberals disagreed), it seems clear that without Libby’s close connection
to the President and the Vice President he would probably not have
even been a candidate for a pardon. In short, whatever the individual
merits of the Libby case, it certainly was a pardon based on favoritism.
And it seems fair to say that in many other cases, and not just in the
Libby case, Bush’s pardons were as problematic as Barbour’s. Even
though Bush may have granted most of the pardons for good and
sufficient reasons, the way that Bush pardoned en masse showed
problems of bias, of favorable treatment, and of sheer arbitrariness.
These pardons show that a theory of pardons needs to regulate the
pardoning process as a whole, because sometimes a pardon is wrong
only when compared to other instances of pardons granted or not
granted.
III. TOWARD A SECOND-BEST THEORY OF PARDONS
The second and third parts of this Article, taken together, frame a
dilemma that arises in many real-world pardons. On the one hand, some
pardons will be clearly justified by good and sufficient reasons. So, for
example, an executive is justified in pardoning when an innocent person
has been convicted and sentenced, or when the sentence is too harsh.
But, if an executive pardons only some of those whom the executive has
good and sufficient reasons to pardon, and selects pardon recipients
along some forbidden ground (race or favoritism) or randomly, then
even individually justified pardons can become morally problematic.
The result is cases such as those examined in the last part: where even
minister-article-1.349796.
98. See Bush Commutes ‘Scooter’ Libby’s Prison Sentence, FOXNEWS.COM (July 2, 2007),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,287780,00.html.
99. Scott Shane & Neil A. Lewis, Bush Commutes Libby Sentence, Saying 30 Months ‘Is
Excessive,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/washington/03
libby.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
100. Thomas M. DeFrank, Ex-VP Dick Cheney Outraged President Bush Didn’t Grant
‘Scooter’ Libby Full Pardon, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009, 11:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ex-vp-dick-cheney-outraged-president-bush-didn-g
rant-scooter-libby-full-pardon-article-1.370889.
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facially “good” pardons, when distributed on a “bad” basis, become
suspect. In an ideal world, an executive would pardon all those who
should be pardoned, and not make choices on whom to pardon for
invidious or arbitrary reasons.
But this does not always happen, so we need a way to assess when
pardons are both good and bad: good because they serve the demands of
justice in individual cases, or bad because they might also involve some
other unfairness. To do this, Part III employs John Rawls’s language of
“ideal” and “nonideal” theory, a distinction closely related to the idea of
“second-best” theory. Pardons are nonideal or second-best in two ways.
First, they are second-best, because in an ideal world, we would never
need to pardon: the laws would be fair, and the sentences given would
be just. But pardons can be second-best in another way, too. Pardons
can be granted in ways that do not accord with our considered notions
of fairness.
Prevailing justifications of the pardoning power focus too much on
the way that pardons can correct individual mistakes in the criminal
justice system; but the justifications have taken too little notice of the
way in which pardons can introduce new kinds of injustices in the way
they are distributed. So we have to be able to judge pardons along both
individual and collective lines, and to explain how sometimes individual
pardons can be unjustified for reasons that are unrelated to the justice of
the particular case. This part, in introducing the distinction between
ideal and nonideal theory, attempts to give us the tools to do just that.
A. Ideal and Nonideal Theory
“Ideal theory” was developed by John Rawls, in his now classic
Theory of Justice.101 Rawls used the term to structure his political
philosophy as a whole. Rawls attempted to sketch his picture of an ideal
society, a “realistic utopia,”102 as he called it: a society that was (as
much as possible for humans) perfectly just. In so doing, Rawls made
certain assumptions. The key assumption was that everyone would
comply with the law.103
If total compliance is taken as the sine qua non of ideal theory, then
there cannot be a full ideal theory of criminal justice.104 If people obey
101. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 245–48 (discussing ideal and nonideal theory).
102. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 128 (1999) (“By showing how the social
world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term
goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today.”).
103. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 25 (“[F]or the most part I examine the principles of justice
that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part
in upholding just institutions.”).
104. Id. (putting “such topics as the theory of punishment” in nonideal, or “partial
compliance,” theory).
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the law, they will never be tried or punished, and so we will not need a
complete understanding or description of the criminal justice system.
This explains, in part, Rawls’s focus in his book on problems of
distributive (and later, social) justice and his almost complete disregard
of questions of crime and punishment.105 Fortunately, however, we can
still use Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory.
We can speak, almost in plain language terms, of ideal theory as
describing that which comes close to embodying, or embodies, our idea
of a perfectly just society. We can then speak of our society, in contrast,
as a nonideal one. The main point that this Article borrows from Rawls
is this: the rules that govern a nonideal society will differ from those
that govern an ideal society, because some things that are necessary to
get to the ideal society may no longer be permissible once we achieve
the ideal society.106 We may have to permit some things in the nonideal
society, in other words, as a way of getting closer to the ideal society.
Rawls’s book is short on examples, and his discussion of nonideal
theory is no exception. He considers the possibility that slavery or
serfdom, given some economically distressed regimes, could be
permissible for a time, until securing the basic liberties was
economically feasible. He also proposes that certain restrictions on
democracy could be justified as a matter of nonideal theory.107 Rawls
makes two points by means of these examples. His first point is that
in certain circumstances, the rules of an ideal society can’t govern a
nonideal society directly, because if they did, that society would never
get to the ideal. The people would starve before the society ever had a
functioning constitutional democracy, for example. In a way, nonideal
theory says that you can bend the ideal rules if you need to, that is, if it
is necessary to one day get to the ideal society.
But Rawls also has a second point which is that even when a society
departs from the ideal, nonideal theory must nonetheless aim for the
ideal. You can bend the ideal rules in some circumstances, but not to the
point of breaking them. Nonideal theory has to take ideal theory as its
guide, because, after all, the point of bending the rules is to get us closer
to the ideal society. Ideal theory constrains nonideal theory not
absolutely, but by presenting a standard that the nonideal society tries to
approximate.108 Not anything goes when circumstances are less than
105. I examine this point further in Chad Flanders, Punishment and Political Philosophy:
The Case of John Rawls (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
106. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 279.
107. Id. (intending to apply these examples to cases of economically developing societies).
108. Here the massive literature on rules and standards is relevant. See, e.g., Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Nonideal theory is
the realm of standards; ideal theory deals with rules—or at least to a rough approximation. See
also Tamar Schapiro, Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions, 100 J.
PHIL. 329, 335 (2003).
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ideal: there will be some point where we have to obey the ideal
The puzzle then becomes: how do we determine when departures
from the ideal rules are permissible and when they are not? We could
imagine one extreme, saying that departures were never permissible, but
this would just be to reject the possibility of nonideal theory. At the
other extreme we could simply give up on ideal theory and just balance
on each occasion. But this extreme is also unpalatable, because we need
a conception of what we are aiming for in order to give content to our
balancing.
There can be no general answer to this puzzle. The notion of “ideal
theory” is at the end of the day a useful metaphor to think about how to
reform society for the better. Should we think mostly in terms of aiming
towards an ideal society? Or should we think instead in terms of
eliminating obvious injustices?109 In the case of pardons, I think it is
best to think in terms of an ideal we are aiming for: the ideal that we
have a criminal justice system that both operates fairly for all and does
not unjustly punish anyone. So we have to ask, what measures can we
use to arrive at this ideal without sacrificing the ideal in the process?
Ideal theory helps us show what is at stake when offenders are pardoned
for morally arbitrary reasons, like race or favoritism. Ideal theory shows
that there may be something wrong with a pardon, even if that pardon in
the individual case is done for good and sufficient reasons.
B. Applying Nonideal Theory to Pardons
Barbour’s pardons were not condemned universally. Some praised
Barbour’s conversion from a strict law-and-order man to one who was
capable of forgiveness, showing his Christian side.110 Others, including
the prominent civil rights lawyer John Payton, hailed Barbour’s large
number of pardons as (merely) putting a dent in mass incarceration. The
main problem was that Barbour had not gone far enough. Barbour's
pardons were only a drop in the bucket, Payton said.111
Importantly, Payton’s perspective puts Barbour’s pardons in the
larger context of the injustice of America’s criminal justice system as a
whole. It is almost universally agreed that too many people are in
prison, for too long, and for relatively minor offenses.112 Recent
declines in the prison population only serve to highlight how far we
have to go. Moreover, the stigma and the harms of those offenses persist
109. Amartya Sen is the most notable exponent of this position. See AMARTYA SEN, THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
110. Gill, supra note 58 (defending Barbour in part on religious grounds).
111. See E.R. Shipp, What’s All the Fuss About in Mississippi?, ROOT (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:16
AM), http://www.theroot.com/views/whats-all-fuss-about-mississippi?page=0,1.
112. For references, see Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 87 &
n.3 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/4

30

Flanders: Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best”

2013]

PARDONS AND THE THEORY OF THE “SECOND-BEST”

1589

well beyond prisoners' release: they struggle to receive aid and find
jobs, and often cannot vote.113 Again, it is very probable that some if not
all of Barbour’s pardons were done for good and sufficient reasons. And
again, most of the offenders were not those who were just released from
prison; rather they had been released for years, had reformed
themselves, and were trying to shed the burden of a past conviction.
This is in a way to repeat what Part II suggested: probably many of
Barbour’s pardons could have been justified by good and sufficient
reasons. But if these pardons were so justified, then they were,
according to Moore, matters of justice. It was unjust that these people
should have suffered from their sentences, and it was a matter of justice
that Barbour should pardon them. The Barbour pardons were at least in
some cases done in the interests of making sentences just. Then how
could they simultaneously be wrong?
It may be useful at this point to step back, and to consider the
problem more abstractly. Suppose that we lived in an ideally just
society, where the criminal law was just and fairly administered. In this
society, all or nearly all trials would result in the conviction of the guilty
and punishment according to desert.114 Still, there would necessarily be
some mistakes in the administration of justice, where people slipped up,
not necessarily intentionally, but as a matter of simple human error.
In an ideal society, where errors are relatively infrequent, we might
see the importance of the pardon power as patching some of the flaws in
the system to make a mostly or nearly just society closer to being a
perfectly just society. Pardons are one way to do this. Other areas of
discretion, in the hands of the police, the prosecutor, or the jury, could
also patch flaws.115 Pardons and these other measures would be, as
many have stated, necessary “safety valves” to the workings of the
criminal justice system, to account for human fallibility. Note, however,
that these would be entirely legalistic pardons, in Moore’s use of the
term. They would be pardons when human actors failed to follow (to the
letter) the theoretically just laws and punishments.
Now suppose we live in a nonideal society in which many criminal
laws themselves are irrational or unjust, sentencing is too harsh,
mandatory minimums are the norm, and past imprisonment harms
offenders far past the date of their release. In such a world, which is
113. See Zachary Hoskins, Ex-Offender Restrictions, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 1), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12028/pdf.
114. On this, see CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS pt. 1, § 46, at 84
(Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., University of Toronto Press 2008)
(1764) (“[C]lemency, a virtue that for sovereigns has sometimes served as a supplement to all
the duties of the throne, should be excluded from the perfect legal code, in which punishments
would be mild and the method of judgment regular and expeditious.”).
115. Barkow groups these points of discretion in her essay on administrative law and the
demise of mercy. Barkow, supra note 14, at 1339–40.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 4

1590

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

very near (or identical) to our world, the regular use of “safety valves”
would be especially important.116 We might actively call for greater use
of safety valves, including jury nullification117 or pardons for everybody
on death row.118 What’s more, the use of these safety valves would be
amply justified as a way to mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshness of
the criminal justice status quo. Barbour’s pardons can certainly be seen
in this light, even if it is only a drop in the bucket. It is probably true
that in our society, as many have argued, the pardon power should be
used more often and more aggressively.119 So again, what is the
problem with Barbour’s pardons given that we live in such a nonideal
world?
The problem, in a sentence, is that although pardons (and other
safety valves) can be used as means of achieving a substantively just
society, there comes a point at which the discriminatory or
indiscriminant use of the pardon power conflicts with the ideal of the
just society. This is what arguably happened in the case of Barbour. It
does no honor to the goal of a racially fair justice system to
disproportionately pardon members of the white race. And it does not
support the idea that justice is nonarbitrary to assign pardons in a
seemingly random manner. Further, a just criminal law is not promoted
when the law is found to bend in favor of family or those with money.
The larger point is that the way the criminal justice system is patched
up, or reformed, must be on the whole consistent with the values of an
ideal criminal justice system. This seems especially important when
those reforms are made in a large-scale manner, as was the case with
Barbour’s pardons. In short, there are constraints on acting justly in
pursuit of a more perfectly just society. These are the constraints that, to
use John Rawls’s terminology, ideal theory places on actors in the real
world.
If pardons are to be given, they should ideally be given for good and
sufficient reasons, and should be distributed because of only those
reasons. That means that pardons cannot be distributed in other ways,
ways that might be racially biased, arbitrary, or based on favoritism. If
pardons are distributed in these ways, then they go against the larger
ideals of criminal justice, and for that reason, are morally suspect, if not
morally impermissible.
Of course, in the real world, pardons will never be perfectly fair.
Like cases will not always be treated in a like manner. Some
116. Gill, supra note 58 (“The pardon power is often the only remedy for those who have
been unfairly or excessively punished in the harsh and inflexible sentencing system we have
spent 30 years building. Pardons and commutations can correct some of these injustices.”).
117. See generally Paul Butler, In Defense of Jury Nullification, 31 LITIG. 46 (2004).
118. See Markel, supra note 61, at 410.
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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arbitrariness seems inevitable in a system administered by human
beings and not by machines. It will also be very difficult, if not
impossible, to compare cases along a common metric. This should not
be a barrier to allowing any pardons, as the next section explains in
greater detail. It is only when the moral arbitrariness is so large as to be
obvious that it becomes a problem, when there does not seem to be any
semblance of following a uniform procedure or standards for offering
pardons. This means that, even if in one sense pardons are permissible
acts of justice, in another sense they are not, insofar as justice also
ideally requires consistency and fairness among like cases. When
pardoning decisions fail to adhere to these ideals, they are morally
problematic, even when they individually have good and sufficient
reasons behind them.
C. Two Important Qualifications
Two qualifications are necessary to clarify the above implications.
The first qualification is that the constraints placed by nonideal theory
still leave considerable room for pardoning. We can pardon all those we
have good and sufficient reasons to pardon, provided that we do so with
minimal bias (no overt racism or favoritism or randomness). Of course
there is not total room. At some place the constraints of ideal theory
have to kick in. This leads to my second qualification: even when the
constraints kick in, there may be some cases where we decide that those
constraints must be abandoned. We might decide that the present
injustice is so great that even ideal theory has to give way, and that the
force of the reasons underlying the individual pardons outweighs the
fact that the pardon is arbitrary, racist, or insincere.
A growing chorus over the past two decades has argued that
executives, especially the President, have used the pardon power too
sparingly. This chorus has grown to a roar over the number of pardons
granted by Obama, one of the lowest of any president’s term.120 George
W. Bush has also been criticized on this score. This Article joins this
chorus. Given the injustice of the status quo there are many pardons that
not only can be made for good and sufficient reasons, but morally ought
to be made.
So this Article should not be taken as a condemnation of the pardon
power—far from it. As elaborated upon in Part I, there is a powerful
moral case for the pardon power in many circumstances. Part II showed
only that there are limits to the pardon power in the individual case and
when we consider individually justified pardons as a whole. This raised
the possibility that an executive’s pardons on the whole might be
morally unjustified.
120. Jackson, supra note 94.
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But this is not the last word. The answer to objections about
problematic on-the-whole pardons is an obvious one. Rather than not
pardon at all, executives should level up.121 Instead of refusing to
pardon because of fear of arbitrarily pardoning, one should, if anything,
be more generous in granting pardons especially given the pervasive
injustice in America’s criminal justice system.122 In the example
referenced above about the two roughly situated individuals (one who
evaded taxes and the other who committed tax fraud123) the answer to
the question of which person should be pardoned is relatively easy: both
should be. Generally, one arbitrary pardon does not render many
legitimate pardons illegitimate. So executives, if anything, should
generally be more generous in giving pardons, not less. It is only when,
in cases such as Barbour’s, one senses that nearly all of the pardons
were arbitrarily granted, that the problem of arbitrary pardons arises.
What Barbour should have done was to level up across the board: he
should have pardoned many more people, not fewer.124 He should have
pardoned not only trusties but all the others on the pardon board’s list.
He should, in short, have pardoned everyone who was justified in
getting a pardon. But the problem is that he did not; he pardoned some
people and failed to pardon others. And this leads to a question: Is there
reason to think that the values of nonarbitrariness, nondiscrimination,
etc., should outweigh the good and sufficient reasons Barbour may have
had for pardoning those he did pardon? In other words, would it have
been better for Barbour to have “leveled down” and pardoned no one
rather than pardon those he did? There is a plausible case to be made
that, yes, he should have. Sometimes the values of ideal theory should
outweigh justice in individual cases, especially when the value of that
justice is relatively minor.
Most of the sentences Barbour commuted were already served; most
of those who were suffering from their crimes were no longer suffering
from the sentences per se, but from the stigma of their crimes. As
Barbour hastened to point out, he freed very few people from prison.125
The value that would actually come from the pardon would be mostly in
avoiding the stigma (and associated harms) of conviction rather than
avoiding the harm of unjust imprisonment; the person who had finished
121. I am grateful to Ronen Avraham for emphasizing this point to me in correspondence.
E-mail from Ronen Avraham, Professor in Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, to Chad Flanders
(Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with author).
122. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
124. This may have only increased the outrage, but if all of the pardons were individually
justified and no one was arbitrarily excluded from a pardon, then the outrage would have been
unwarranted.
125. The title of Barbour’s Washington Post op-ed advertises this fact. See Barbour, supra
note 11.
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her term of years would now no longer be considered a “felon” in the
eyes of the law thanks to Barbour’s pardons. In these cases, the ideals of
ideal theory should probably win out, because the individual injustices
that would be cured are relatively minor, and the violation of the values
of consistency and fairness seemed patent. Of course, that does not
make them any less unjust, nor does it mean that the best thing for
Barbour to do would have been to pardon more people.
Then we get to the cases that make up most of this Article’s
examples,126 in which the death sentences of some were reduced to life
in prison, but not for all of those who were similarly situated. Is the
answer to this to not pardon any of them, and let them all be executed?
Should the value of consistency win out even here?127 Certainly, this
would not be the favored outcome: the favored outcome would be that
none of them should be put to death. But then we have to ask, what if
this outcome (for whatever reason) is unavailable? Does that mean that
the second-best option to pardoning some is to pardon none? This
sounds like an unacceptably harsh result. Arbitrary pardons in this case
might be the true “second-best.” Better that some avoid death than all
face the death penalty.
In the 1970s, the arbitrariness and racial selectiveness of the death
penalty was hotly debated: those who were against the death penalty
vigorously argued that the randomness of the death penalty was a strong
reason against it.128 But their counterparts replied that the remedy for
randomness was to equally give more people the death penalty rather
than to abolish the penalty altogether.129 This Article does not get into
the particulars of this debate but only notes the similarity to the question
above. On one side were those favoring the rule-of-law values of
consistency and fairness. On the other side were those who favored the
substantive justice of the death penalty in individual cases. Of course, in
the death penalty debate, the rule-of-law values were supported by the
death penalty opponents, and the substantive justice values by the
proponents. But the structure of the debate seems similar to the question
we are facing: in the case of the conflict, what should win, substantive
justice or procedural values?
There may be no general answer to this question in some extreme
cases, including the death penalty. This Article uses the examples in
126. See supra Section II.A.
127. One is reminded in this respect of the old adage that “consistency is the hobgoblin of
little minds.”
128. See Nathanson, supra note 72 (arguing that the arbitrariness of the death penalty was a
reason to oppose it).
129. See especially the contribution of Ernest van den Haag in ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG &
JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 55–56 (1983) (arguing that the individual
justice of executing one person was not affected at all by the fact that some escaped justice).
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Part II to identify situations in which the use of pardons could be
morally problematic, and not morally prohibited. Racism, favoritism,
and arbitrariness seem to be strong reasons to question the justice of a
punishment, whether a punishment is being imposed or removed. This
is why in the race case, the awfulness of the discriminatory message
sent by pardoning only whites might be sufficient to trump the
substantive injustice (if it is one) of execution.130
CONCLUSION
Over the years there have been many proposals from both
practitioners and academics to remove the pardon power from the
executive or to reduce the power and give it to an independent board or
commission.131 I am not sure this will happen, nor am I sure that it
should. Boards would mean greater delays in pardons, something that is
not always good; boards might also mean fewer pardons, as there might
be disagreement about who ought to be pardoned. Executive power has
historically meant the power for quick action, whether for good or for
bad. In pardoning, quick action can often be desirable, necessary, and
the best remedy. Some of the delay in recent pardons owes to too many
layers of review, too much bureaucracy, and too many hands in the pot.
But if we favor quick action, we need to be even clearer on the moral
constraints that operate on anyone exercising the pardon power. Solving
the question of who should pardon does not get us any closer to
specifying what the ground rules for pardoning should be. Wherever the
pardoning power rests, this Article has described an additional moral
check on that power. The power should be considered good or bad not
only individually, but also when we look at the pardons over time and
as a whole. We should look at patterns, in other words, not just at
cases—because pardons can be wrong not just in individual instances,
but also when considered in groups.
More generally, this Article proposes a framework for evaluating
what we might call discretionary acts of justice throughout the criminal
justice system, and not only in the executive. Those acts, too, should be
considered in terms of whether they are, broadly speaking, consistent
with an ideal theory of criminal justice. Do they help us bring about that
ideal, in a way that reflects the values of that ideal? Or do they violate
those values? Actors within the criminal justice system need to be
mindful not only of how they act in a single case, but of what legal
130. Again, I am only dealing with the case of guilty people who are given an unjust
penalty. I think the calculus changes if we move to consider innocent people facing the death
penalty. Then, it seems to me that justice would require saving anyone you could, even if this
could only be done on morally arbitrary grounds.
131. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123,
1149 (2012).
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virtues they display over time and across many cases.
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